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Helping And Sabotaging In Tournaments

Author

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  • MATTHIAS KRÄKEL

    (BWL II, University of Bonn, Adenaueralle 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany)

Abstract

A two-stage, two-person tournament is discussed, in which each player can influence the other one at the first stage by choosing help, sabotage or no action. At the second stage, the players choose effort to win the tournament. Helping and sabotaging have two effects — they influence the likelihood of winning (likelihood effect) and they determine the equilibrium efforts and, therefore, effort costs (cost effect). Depending on the interplay of the two effects, diverse types of equilibria are possible. In particular, if the cost effect dominates the likelihood effect (i.e., both players concentrate on minimizing effort costs), two asymmetric equilibria will coexist in which one player helps his opponent, whereas the other one chooses sabotage and vice versa.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthias Kräkel, 2005. "Helping And Sabotaging In Tournaments," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(02), pages 211-228.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:02:n:s0219198905000491
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198905000491
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kräkel, Matthias, 2005. "Doping in Contest-Like Situations," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 46, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    2. Dato, Simon & Nieken, Petra, 2014. "Gender differences in competition and sabotage," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 64-80.
    3. Kräkel, Matthias, 2006. "Doping and Cheating in Contest-Like Situations," IZA Discussion Papers 2059, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Christian Deutscher & Bernd Frick & Oliver Gürtler & Joachim Prinz, 2013. "Sabotage in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Contestants: Empirical Evidence from the Soccer Pitch," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(4), pages 1138-1157, October.
    5. Luo, Zijun & Xie, Xin, 2018. "A Model Of rivalries with endogenous prize and strength," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 215-223.
    6. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Anastasia Danilov & Martin G. Kocher, 2023. "The Lifecycle of Affirmative Action Policies and Its Effect on Effort and Sabotage Behavior," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 401, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    7. Brown, Alasdair & Chowdhury, Subhasish M., 2017. "The hidden perils of affirmative action: Sabotage in handicap contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 273-284.
    8. Cedric Duvinage & Peter-J. Jost, 2019. "The Role of Referees in Professional Sports Contests," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 20(8), pages 1014-1050, December.
    9. Jörg Franke, 2014. "Equal, proportional, and mixed sharing of cooperative production under the threat of sabotage," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 113(3), pages 253-273, November.
    10. Gurtler, Oliver, 2008. "On sabotage in collective tournaments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3-4), pages 383-393, February.
    11. Eberlein, Marion & Walkowitz, Gari, 2008. "Positive and Negative Team Identity in a Promotion Game," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 13/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    12. Subhasish Chowdhury & Oliver Gürtler, 2015. "Sabotage in contests: a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 135-155, July.
    13. Danilov, Anastasia & Harbring, Christine & Irlenbusch, Bernd, 2019. "Helping under a combination of team and tournament incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 120-135.
    14. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2012. "Productive versus destructive efforts in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 461-468.
    15. Oliver Gürtler, 2010. "Collusion in homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 100(3), pages 265-280, July.
    16. Maria Arbatskaya & Hugo M. Mialon, 2012. "Dynamic Multi‐Activity Contests," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(2), pages 520-538, June.
    17. Raphaël Soubeyran, 2009. "Contest with attack and defense: does negative campaigning increase or decrease voter turnout?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 337-353, March.
    18. Kjell Hausken, 2020. "Additive multi-effort contests," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 89(2), pages 203-248, September.
    19. Kjell Hausken, 2021. "Axiomatizing additive multi-effort contests," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 1(11), pages 1-12, November.
    20. Krakel, Matthias, 2007. "Doping and cheating in contest-like situations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 988-1006, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cost effect; likelihood effect; tournament; JEL classification code: J31; JEL classification code: J33; JEL classification code: M5;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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