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The Lifecycle of Affirmative Action Policies and Its Effect on Effort and Sabotage Behavior

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  • Subhasish M. Chowdhury

    (Department of Economics, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S1 4DT, UK.)

  • Anastasia Danilov

    (School of Management and Economics, Humboldt-University of Berlin, 10178 Berlin, Germany.)

  • Martin G. Kocher

    (Department of Economics, University of Vienna, 1090 Vienna, Austria; Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden; and CESifo Munich.)

Abstract

A main goal of affirmative action (AA) policies is to enable disadvantaged groups to compete with their privileged counterparts. Existing theoretical and empirical research documents that incorporating AA can result in both more egalitarian outcomes and higher exerted efforts. However, the direct behavioral effects of the introduction and removal of such policies are still under-researched. It is also unclear how specific AA policy instruments, for instance, head- start for a disadvantaged group or handicap for the privileged group, affect behavior. We examine these questions in a laboratory experiment in which individuals participate in a real- effort tournament and can sabotage each other. We find that AA does not necessarily result in higher effort. High performers that already experienced an existing AA-free tournament reduce their effort levels after the introduction of the AA policy. There is less sabotage under AA when the tournament started directly with the AA regime. The removal of AA policies, however, significantly intensifies sabotage. Finally, there are no overall systematic differences between handicap and head-start in terms of effort provision or sabotaging behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Anastasia Danilov & Martin G. Kocher, 2023. "The Lifecycle of Affirmative Action Policies and Its Effect on Effort and Sabotage Behavior," Working Papers 2023012, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:shf:wpaper:2023012
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    File URL: https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/economics/research/serps
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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