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Doping in Contest-Like Situations

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  • Kräkel, Matthias

Abstract

Individuals who compete in a contest-like situation (for example, in sports, in promotion tournaments, or in an appointment contest) may have an incentive to illegally utilize resources in order to improve their relative positions. We analyze such doping within a tournament game between two heterogeneous players. Three major effects are identified which determine a player’s doping decision — a cost effect, a likelihood effect and a windfall-profit effect. Moreover, we discuss whether the favorite or the underdog is more likely to be doped, the impact of doping on overall performance, the influence of increased heterogeneity on doping, the welfare implications of doping, and possible prevention of doping.

Suggested Citation

  • Kräkel, Matthias, 2005. "Doping in Contest-Like Situations," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 46, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:46
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    File URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13502/1/46.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Aleksander Berentsen & Esther Bruegger & Simon Loertscher, 2007. "The evolution of cheating in asymmetric contests," IEW - Working Papers 314, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Jean Tirole, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality)," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22.
    4. Aleksander Berentsen & Yvan Lengwiler, 2004. "Fraudulent Accounting and Other Doping Games," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(3), pages 402-402, September.
    5. Ian Preston, 2003. "Cheating in Contests," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(4), pages 612-624, Winter.
    6. Konrad, Kai A, 2000. "Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 155-165, April.
    7. Sonia Falconieri & Frédéric Palomino & József Sákovics, 2004. "Collective Versus Individual Sale of Television Rights in League Sports," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 833-862, September.
    8. Nicolas EBER & Jacques THÉPOT, 1999. "Doping in Sport and Competition Design," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1999044, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    9. Wolfgang Maennig, 2002. "On the Economics of Doping and Corruption in International Sports," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 3(1), pages 61-89, February.
    10. Stefan Szymanski & Stefan KÈsenne, 2004. "Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 165-177, March.
    11. Fairburn, James A. & Malcomson, James M., 1994. "Rewarding performance by promotion to a different job," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 683-690, April.
    12. Kong-Pin Chen, 2003. "Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 119-140, April.
    13. Berentsen, Aleksander, 2002. "The economics of doping," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 109-127, March.
    14. Stefan Szymanski, 2003. "The Economic Design of Sporting Contests," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1137-1187, December.
    15. Dragon, Robert & Garvey, Gerald T. & Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 1996. "A collective tournament," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 223-227, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Kräkel, 2006. "Zur Reform der Professorenbesoldung in Deutschland," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 7(1), pages 105-126, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    contest; doping; drugs; fraud in research; tournament.;

    JEL classification:

    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics

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