Fraudulent Accounting and Other Doping Games
From a game-theoretic point of view, fraudulent accounting to embellish the financial status of a firm and the use of drugs to enhance performance in sports are very similar. We study the replicator dynamics of such games. We allow for heterogeneous populations, such as highly talented versus more mediocre athletes, or high-quality managers versus less able colleagues. For some parameters we find cyclical dynamics, so we may see waves of doping and clean sport, and cycles of fraudulent and honest accounting. Moreover, in some cases, high-ability players are more likely to commit fraud than low-ability ones.
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Volume (Year): 160 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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