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Why Zero Tolerance Of Misconduct Is Undesirable In Contests

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  • Scott M. Gilpatric
  • Cristina M. Reiser

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  • Scott M. Gilpatric & Cristina M. Reiser, 2017. "Why Zero Tolerance Of Misconduct Is Undesirable In Contests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(2), pages 1145-1160, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:55:y:2017:i:2:p:1145-1160
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Shavell, Steven, 1992. "A note on marginal deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 345-355, September.
    4. George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-580, June.
    6. Brian A. Jacob & Steven D. Levitt, 2003. "Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(3), pages 843-877.
    7. Subhasish Chowdhury & Oliver Gürtler, 2015. "Sabotage in contests: a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 135-155, July.
    8. Berentsen, Aleksander, 2002. "The economics of doping," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 109-127, March.
    9. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1994. "Marginal Deterrence in Enforcement of Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 1039-1066, October.
    10. Scott M. Gilpatric, 2011. "Cheating In Contests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(4), pages 1042-1053, October.
    11. Curry Philip A. & Mongrain Steeve, 2009. "Deterrence in Rank-Order Tournaments," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 723-740, December.
    12. Barry J. Nalebuff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1983. "Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 21-43, Spring.
    13. C. Jill Stowe & Scott M. Gilpatric, 2010. "Cheating and Enforcement in Asymmetric Rank-Order Tournaments," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 1-14, July.
    14. Krakel, Matthias, 2007. "Doping and cheating in contest-like situations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 988-1006, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Frances Xu Lee & Wing Suen, 2023. "Gaming A Selective Admissions System," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(1), pages 413-443, February.
    2. Scott M. Gilpatric & Ye Hong, 2023. "Optimal Contest Design When Policing Damaging Behavior," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-22, June.
    3. Mario Lackner & Hendrik Sonnabend, 2022. "The older the wiser? Determinants of misbehaviour in team contests," Economics working papers 2022-11, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    4. Music, Kasim & Salzmann, Christian, 2020. "Why biased agencies could be the best monitors," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).

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