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Cheating and Enforcement in Asymmetric Rank-Order Tournaments

Listed author(s):
  • C. Jill Stowe


    (Department of Agricultural Economics and Department of Economics, University of Kentucky, 307 C.E. Barnhart Building, Lexington, KY 40506-0276, USA)

  • Scott M. Gilpatric


    (Department of Economics, University of Tennessee, 520 Stokely Management Center, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA)

In rank-order tournaments, undesirable but output-enhancing activities, such as cheating, may occur. Cheating may be especially tempting when one player has an advantage over another. We show that when audit probabilities are low (high), the leading (trailing) player has more incentive to cheat. Furthermore, we show that ‘‘correlated’’ audits are more effective at decreasing the frequency of cheating than independent audits. Finally, we show that differential monitoring schemes, where contestants are audited based on either their initial position or final ranking, more efficiently achieve full deterrence than schemes that monitor contestants with equal probability.

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Article provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 77 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 1-14

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Handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:77:1:y:2010:p:1-14
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