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Cheating and Enforcement in Asymmetric Rank-Order Tournaments

Author

Listed:
  • C. Jill Stowe

    () (Department of Agricultural Economics and Department of Economics, University of Kentucky, 307 C.E. Barnhart Building, Lexington, KY 40506-0276, USA)

  • Scott M. Gilpatric

    () (Department of Economics, University of Tennessee, 520 Stokely Management Center, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA)

Abstract

In rank-order tournaments, undesirable but output-enhancing activities, such as cheating, may occur. Cheating may be especially tempting when one player has an advantage over another. We show that when audit probabilities are low (high), the leading (trailing) player has more incentive to cheat. Furthermore, we show that ‘‘correlated’’ audits are more effective at decreasing the frequency of cheating than independent audits. Finally, we show that differential monitoring schemes, where contestants are audited based on either their initial position or final ranking, more efficiently achieve full deterrence than schemes that monitor contestants with equal probability.

Suggested Citation

  • C. Jill Stowe & Scott M. Gilpatric, 2010. "Cheating and Enforcement in Asymmetric Rank-Order Tournaments," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 1-14, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:77:1:y:2010:p:1-14
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.4284/sej.2010.77.1.1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Mueller, 2013. "The Doping Threshold in Sport Contests," Working papers 2013/05, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    2. Nicolas Eber, 2012. "Doping and Anti-doping Measures," Chapters,in: International Handbook on the Economics of Mega Sporting Events, chapter 12 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Nicolas Eber, 2011. "Fair play in contests," Journal of Economics, Springer, pages 253-270.
    4. Laurent Germain & Fabrice Rousseau & Anne Vanhems, 2014. "Irrational Market Makers," Finance, Presses universitaires de Grenoble, pages 107-145.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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