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Asymmetric Doping Effects and Sanctions in Sporting Contests

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  • Paul O’Sullivan

    (Economics, National University of Ireland, Maynooth)

Abstract

This paper analyses a one-shot game where, prior to a contest, two athletes simultaneously decide whether to engage in doping that is not certain to be detected. Doping is assumed to have at least as great a proportional effect on a naturally weaker athlete’s win probability. Given an explicit contest success function, the paper derives an optimal sanction scheme, where sanctions are identically proportional to prizes, sufficient to always induce a no-doping equilibrium. In comparison to previous papers, the winner’s optimal sanction, expressed in terms of talent and doping levels and doping costs, may be lower for all detection probabilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul O’Sullivan, 2015. "Asymmetric Doping Effects and Sanctions in Sporting Contests," Economics Department Working Paper Series n262-15.pdf, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
    • Handle: RePEc:may:mayecw:n262-15.pdf
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    File URL: http://repec.maynoothuniversity.ie/mayecw-files/N262-15.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ian Preston, 2003. "Cheating in Contests," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 19(4), pages 612-624, Winter.
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    6. Nicolas Eber, 2008. "The Performance-Enhancing Drug Game Reconsidered," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 9(3), pages 318-327, June.
    7. Berentsen, Aleksander, 2002. "The economics of doping," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 109-127, March.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • Z28 - Other Special Topics - - Sports Economics - - - Policy

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