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Deterrence in Rank-Order Tournaments

Author

Listed:
  • Curry Philip A.

    (Simon Fraser University)

  • Mongrain Steeve

    (Simon Fraser University)

Abstract

In a tournament competitors may cheat to gain an advantage. This paper considers the problem of deterrence and finds that tournaments reflect special circumstances that are not present in a traditional model of law enforcement. The traditional model considers sanctions and monitoring as the instruments of deterrence. In a tournament the prize structure plays a critical role in determining both the costs and benefits to cheating. We consider ways in which the prize structure can be manipulated in order to reduce monitoring costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Curry Philip A. & Mongrain Steeve, 2009. "Deterrence in Rank-Order Tournaments," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 723-740, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:5:y:2009:i:1:n:30
    DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1338
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Müller, Daniel, 2013. "The Doping Threshold in Sport Contests," Working papers 2013/05, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    2. Scott M. Gilpatric & Cristina M. Reiser, 2017. "Why Zero Tolerance Of Misconduct Is Undesirable In Contests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(2), pages 1145-1160, April.
    3. Gill, David & Prowse, Victoria & Vlassopoulos, Michael, 2013. "Cheating in the workplace: An experimental study of the impact of bonuses and productivity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 120-134.
    4. Volker Robeck, 2014. "Professional Cycling and the Fight against Doping," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201456, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    5. Nicolas Eber, 2012. "Doping and Anti-doping Measures," Chapters, in: Wolfgang Maennig & Andrew Zimbalist (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Mega Sporting Events, chapter 12, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Dmitry Ryvkin, 2013. "Contests With Doping," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 14(3), pages 253-275, June.
    7. Subhasish Chowdhury & Oliver Gürtler, 2015. "Sabotage in contests: a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 135-155, July.
    8. Sebastian Bervoets & Bruno Decreuse & Mathieu Faure, 2014. "A Renewed Analysis of Cheating in Contests: Theory and Evidence from Recovery Doping," AMSE Working Papers 1441, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Jun 2015.
    9. Wu, Qin & Bayer, Ralph-C & Lenten, Liam J.A., 2020. "Conditional Pension Funds to Combat Cheating in Sporting Contests: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    10. Mürüvvet Büyükboyacı, 2016. "A Designer'S Choice Between Single-Prize And Parallel Tournaments," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(4), pages 1774-1789, October.
    11. Nicolas Eber, 2011. "Fair play in contests," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 103(3), pages 253-270, July.
    12. Qin Wu & Raph C-Bayer & Liam Lenten, 2016. "A Comparison of Anti-Doping Measures in Sporting Contests," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2016-11, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    13. Kjetil K Haugen & Tamás Nepusz & Andrea Petróczi, 2013. "The Multi-Player Performance-Enhancing Drug Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(5), pages 1-7, May.
    14. Faravelli, Marco & Friesen, Lana & Gangadharan, Lata, 2015. "Selection, tournaments, and dishonesty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 160-175.
    15. Paul O’Sullivan, 2015. "Asymmetric Doping Effects and Sanctions in Sporting Contests," Economics Department Working Paper Series n262-15.pdf, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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