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Asymmetric Conflicts with Endogenous Dimensionality

  • Dan Kovenock
  • Michael J. Mauboussin
  • Brian Roberson

This article examines a two-stage model of asymmetric conflict based on the classic Colonel Blotto game in which players have, in the first stage, the ability to increase the number of battlefields contested. It thereby endogenizes the “dimensionality” of conflict. In equilibrium, if the asymmetry in the players’ resource endowments exceeds a threshold, the weak player chooses to add battlefields, while the strong player never does. Adding battlefields spreads the strong player’s forces more thinly, increasing the incidence of favorable strategic mismatches for the weak player.

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Paper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1259.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1259
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Web page: http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/programs/phd

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  1. Kong-Pin Chen, 2003. "Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 119-140, April.
  2. Berentsen, Aleksander, 2002. "The economics of doping," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 109-127, March.
  3. Konrad, Kai A, 2000. "Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 155-65, April.
  4. Konrad, Kai A., 2005. "Tournaments and Multiple Productive Inputs: The Case of Performance Enhancing Drugs," IZA Discussion Papers 1844, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-80, June.
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