Asymmetric Conflicts with Endogenous Dimensionality
This article examines a two-stage model of asymmetric conflict based on the classic Colonel Blotto game in which players have, in the first stage, the ability to increase the number of battlefields contested. It thereby endogenizes the “dimensionality” of conflict. In equilibrium, if the asymmetry in the players’ resource endowments exceeds a threshold, the weak player chooses to add battlefields, while the strong player never does. Adding battlefields spreads the strong player’s forces more thinly, increasing the incidence of favorable strategic mismatches for the weak player.
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