Contests where there is variation in the marginal productivity of effort
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- Curry Philip A. & Mongrain Steeve, 2009. "Deterrence in Rank-Order Tournaments," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 723-740, December.
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More about this item
KeywordsOptimal contest; Contest design; Asymmetric information; Correlated abilities.;
- D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
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