Contests where there is variation in the marginal productivity of effort
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- Curry Philip A. & Mongrain Steeve, 2009. "Deterrence in Rank-Order Tournaments," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 723-740, December.
- Dmitry Ryvkin, 2007. "Tullock contests of weakly heterogeneous players," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 49-64, July.
- repec:elg:eechap:15325_5 is not listed on IDEAS
- David Perez Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2014. "Discrimination in a new model of contests with two-sided asymmetric information," Working Papers 1407, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
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- Marco Runkel, 2004. "Optimal Contest Design When The Designer's Payoff Depends On Competitive Balance," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 156, Royal Economic Society.
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"Information alliances in contests with budget limits,"
Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 679-693, June.
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- Konrad, Kai A., 2012. "Information alliances in contests with budget limits," Munich Reprints in Economics 22072, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Gil Epstein & Igal Milchtaich & Shmuel Nitzan & Mordechai Schwarz, 2007. "Ambiguous political power and contest efforts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 113-123, July.
- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2013. "Asymmetries in Rent-Seeking," EconomiX Working Papers 2013-5, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
- Daniel Lee, 2008. "Going once, going twice, sold! The committee assignment process as an all-pay auction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 237-255, June.
- Ando, Munetomo, 2004. "Division of a contest with identical prizes," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 282-297, June.
- Junichiro Ishida, 2006. "Seniority bias in a tournament," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 10(2), pages 143-164, August.
- Jörg Franke & Christian Kanzow & Wolfgang Leininger & Alexandra Schwartz, 2013. "Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(2), pages 589-630, March.
- Munetomo Ando, 2004. "Overconfidence in Economic Contests," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 708, Econometric Society.
More about this item
KeywordsOptimal contest; Contest design; Asymmetric information; Correlated abilities.;
- D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
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