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Asymmetries in Rent-Seeking

  • Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci
  • Eric Langlais
  • Bruno Lovat
  • Francesco Parisi

In rent-seeking contests, players are seldom identical to one another. In this chapter, we examine the rent-seeking literature that explores the effects of specific forms of asymmetry between contestants. We consider Tullock’s rent-seeking contests involving two players who differ in strength (marginal returns to effort), motivation (valuations of the sought-after rent) and cunning (bargaining power). We study the combined interaction of these three possible forms of asymmetry in rent-seeking. We examine how these asymmetries affect the rent-seeking contest and investigate the effect of ex post trading opportunities on the players’ efforts, on probabilities of winning and on the social costs of rent-seeking.

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Paper provided by University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX in its series EconomiX Working Papers with number 2013-5.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2013-5
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