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Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations: Addition or deletion of a player

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  • Alexander Matros

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Abstract

We consider an extension of Tullock's (1980) N-player contest under which prize valuations may vary across players. We show that the pure-strategy equilibrium of this contest is unique. We also establish the following results: rent dissipation increases, individual winning probabilities decrease, and individual spending either increases or decreases with the addition of a player. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, B.V. 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Matros, 2006. "Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations: Addition or deletion of a player," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 369-380, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:129:y:2006:i:3:p:369-380
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9037-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nti, Kofi O, 1999. "Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-430, March.
    2. Stein, William E, 2002. "Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More Than Two Contestants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 325-336, December.
    3. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Grandjean, G. & Tellone, D. & Vergote, W., 2016. "Cooperation, Competition and Entry in a Tullock Contest," CORE Discussion Papers 2016032, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Matros, Alexander, 2012. "Sad-Loser contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 155-162.
    3. repec:elg:eechap:15325_5 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Balart, Pau & Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Troumpounis, Orestis, 2017. "Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 126-130.
    5. Lambert Schoonbeek, 2009. "Bribing potential entrants in a rent-seeking contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 153-158, April.
    6. Kovenock, Dan & Roberson, Brian, 2011. "Non-partisan ‘get-out-the-vote’ efforts and policy outcomes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 728-739.
    7. Haruo Imai & Hannu Salonen (corresponding author), 2012. "Bargaining and Rent Seeking," Discussion Papers 80, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    8. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2013. "Asymmetries in Rent-Seeking," EconomiX Working Papers 2013-5, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    9. Tobias Wenzel, 2014. "Independent Service Operators in ATM Markets," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 61(1), pages 26-47, February.
    10. Adriana Gama & David Michael Rietzke, 2017. "Robust Comparative Statics in Contests," Working Papers 173174403, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    11. Alexander Matros & David Michael Rietzke, 2017. "Contests on Networks," Working Papers 156630581, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    12. Grandjean, G. & Tellone, D. & Vergote, W., 2017. "Endogenous network formation in a Tullock contest," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-10.
    13. Robert Ritz, 2008. "Influencing rent-seeking contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 291-300, June.

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