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On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests

  • Boudreau, James W.
  • Shunda, Nicholas

We apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players’ perceived prize valuations in contests. Evolution in finite populations leads to preferences that overstate the prize’s material value and induce overexpenditure. We establish an equivalence between evolutionarily stable strategies and the behavior induced by evolutionarily stable preferences.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 116 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 498-501

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:3:p:498-501
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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