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On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests

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Listed author(s):
  • Boudreau, James W.
  • Shunda, Nicholas

Abstract

We apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players’ perceived prize valuations in contests. Evolution in finite populations leads to preferences that overstate the prize’s material value and induce overexpenditure. We establish an equivalence between evolutionarily stable strategies and the behavior induced by evolutionarily stable preferences.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176512002005
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 116 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 498-501

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:3:p:498-501
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.059
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

Keywords: Contest; Prize valuation; Preference evolution; Evolutionarily stable preferences;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
  • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
  • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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Cited by:

  1. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2016. "Evolutionary determinants of war," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(4), pages 520-534, August.
  2. Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2016. "Bargaining with incomplete information: Evolutionary stability in finite populations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 118-131.

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