Going once, going twice, sold! The committee assignment process as an all-pay auction
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- Glazer, Amihai & Hassin, Refael, 1988. "Optimal Contests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(1), pages 133-43, January.
- Brian Roberson, 2006. "The Colonel Blotto game," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 1-24, September.
- Nirvikar Singh & Donald Wittman, 2001. "Contests where there is variation in the marginal productivity of effort," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 711-744.
- Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987.
"Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
452, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Coker, David C & Crain, W Mark, 1994. " Legislative Committees as Loyalty-Generating Institutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(3-4), pages 195-221, December.
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