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Going once, going twice, sold! The committee assignment process as an all-pay auction

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  • Daniel Lee

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  • Daniel Lee, 2008. "Going once, going twice, sold! The committee assignment process as an all-pay auction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 237-255, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:135:y:2008:i:3:p:237-255
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9256-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Helmut Bester & Kai A. Konrad, 2005. "Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 17(2), pages 199-215, April.
    2. Denzau, Arthur T. & Munger, Michael C., 1986. "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 89-106, March.
    3. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
    4. Brian Roberson, 2006. "The Colonel Blotto game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 1-24, September.
    5. Krehbiel, Keith, 1990. "Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(1), pages 149-163, March.
    6. Coker, David C & Crain, W Mark, 1994. "Legislative Committees as Loyalty-Generating Institutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(3-4), pages 195-221, December.
    7. Glazer, Amihai & Hassin, Refael, 1988. "Optimal Contests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(1), pages 133-143, January.
    8. Kenneth Shepsle, 1975. "Congressional committee assignments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 55-78, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Huseyin Yildirim, 2010. "Distribution of surplus in sequential bargaining with endogenous recognition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(1), pages 41-57, January.
    2. Christian Fong & Joshua McCrain, 2025. "A tournament theory of congressional committee leadership," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 202(1), pages 193-215, January.
    3. James W. Boudreau & Haikady N. Nagaraja & Lucas Rentschler & Shane D. Sanders, 2024. "The role of luck in political and economic competition: noisy all-pay auctions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 199(1), pages 137-157, April.

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