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Can term limits reduce political sabotage? Evidence from negative campaigning in gubernatorial races

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  • Minchuk, Yizhaq
  • Raveh, Ohad

Abstract

We study the role of term limits in reducing sabotage in political contests, vis-à-vis negative campaigning in gubernatorial races. A model of political contests, with endogenous sabotage and asymmetries in electoral support and future terms, indicates that the (aggregate) extent of sabotage may decline when incumbents are term-limited (lame-ducks). We validate this using close to 7 million political TV ads from U.S. gubernatorial elections (2000–2020) while leveraging plausibly exogenous variations across space and time in state term-limit regimes. Results show that campaigning is substantially less negative when incumbents are term-limited: having a lame-duck incumbent in the race decreases campaign negativity by approximately one standard deviation. The results shed light on the potential role of term limits in reducing the extent of sabotage in political contests, as well as on hitherto overlooked political externalities of reelection prospects.

Suggested Citation

  • Minchuk, Yizhaq & Raveh, Ohad, 2025. "Can term limits reduce political sabotage? Evidence from negative campaigning in gubernatorial races," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:89:y:2025:i:c:s0176268025000849
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102724
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    JEL classification:

    • P18 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Energy; Environment
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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