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Do campaign contributions fuel political sabotage?

Author

Listed:
  • David Lagziel

    (BGU)

  • Ohad Raveh

    (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

  • Yan Zhang

    (School of Economics, the Institute of Ecological Civilization, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, China)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • David Lagziel & Ohad Raveh & Yan Zhang, 2025. "Do campaign contributions fuel political sabotage?," Working Papers 2512, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:2512
    as

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    File URL: https://tzin.bgu.ac.il/econfiles/monaster_papers/papers/2025/2512.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General

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