An Experimental Test of Sabotage in Tournaments
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More about this item
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
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