Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years
This paper compares the fiscal behavior of states with and without the voter initiative over the last thirty years. The main finding is that total spending was significantly lower in initiative states than in noninitiative states. Local spending was higher and state spending was lower in initiative states. On the revenue side, initiative states relied less on broad-based taxes and more on charges tied to services. Taken together, the evidence indicates that the initiative leads to a reduction in the overall size of government and suggests that it causes a decline in the level of redistributional activity. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.
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