The eclipse of legislatures: Direct democracy in the 21st century
Demographic, political, and technological trends are fueling an unprecedented growth in direct democracy worldwide. If the trends continue, direct democracy threatens to eclipse legislatures in setting the policy agenda. This article reviews existing scientific knowledge about the initiative and referendum – the main institutions of direct democracy – and highlights key issues for the future. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005
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