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Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation

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  • Kroszner, Randall S.

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  • Kroszner, Randall S., 1999. "Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation," Working Papers 151, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:151
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    9. Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, 1981. "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview," NBER Chapters, in: Studies in Public Regulation, pages 1-78, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    11. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-1187, December.
    12. Michael C. Jensen, 1991. "Corporate Control And The Politics Of Finance," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 4(2), pages 13-34, June.
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    27. Irwin, Douglas A & Kroszner, Randall S, 1999. "Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawley," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 643-673, October.
    28. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 1999. "Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflicts of Interest, and Lender Liability," NBER Working Papers 7319, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    35. Kroszner, Randall S & Strahan, Philip E, 1996. "Regulatory Incentives and the Thrift Crisis: Dividends, Mutual-to-Stock Conversions, and Financial Distress," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1285-1319, September.
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    1. Kroszner, Randall S., 2000. "Obstacles To Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," Working Papers 158, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    2. Kroszner, Randall S. & Stratmann, Thomas, 1999. "Does Political Ambiguity Pay? Corporate Campaign contributions and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation," Working Papers 155, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.

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