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Recurrent High Inflation and Stabilization: A Dynamic Game

  • Mondino, Guillermo
  • Sturzenegger, Federico
  • Tommasi, Mariano

The authors analyze the dynamics of inflation that arise from fiscal deficits caused by the noncooperative behavior of interest groups. The 'state' variable is the degree of financial adaptation, a proxy for the share of wealth agents hold in alternatives to domestic currency. As financial adaptation becomes widespread, the costs of financing a given budget deficit rise. In this context, there can be fully rational cycles of increasing inflation and financial adaptation, followed by stabilization and remonetization. The model seems applicable to the experience of many Latin American countries. Copyright 1996 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 37 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 981-96

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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:37:y:1996:i:4:p:981-96
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  1. Casella, Alessandra & Feinstein, Jonathan S, 1990. "Economic Exchange during Hyperinflation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 1-27, February.
  2. Alberto Alesina & Allan Drazen, 1989. "Why are Stabilizations Delayed?," NBER Working Papers 3053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Driffill, John & Mizon, Grayham E. & Ulph, Alistair, 1990. "Costs of inflation," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: B. M. Friedman & F. H. Hahn (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 19, pages 1013-1066 Elsevier.
  4. Thomas J. Sargent, 1981. "The ends of four big inflations," Working Papers 158, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  5. Pablo E. Guidotti & Carlos A. Végh, 1997. "Losing Credibility: The Stabilization Blues," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 122, Universidad del CEMA.
  6. Dornbusch, Rudiger & Fischer, Stanley, 1993. "Moderate Inflation," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 7(1), pages 1-44, January.
  7. Robert E. Lucas Jr. & Nancy L. Stokey, 1982. "Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy Without Capital," Discussion Papers 532, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Tabellini, Guido, 1986. "Money, debt and deficits in a dynamic game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 427-442, December.
  9. Federico A. Sturzenegger, 1992. "Inflation and Social Welfare in a Model with Endogenous Financial Adaptation," UCLA Economics Working Papers 658, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Federico Sturzenegger, 1992. "Inflation and Social Welfare in a Model With Endogenous Financial Adaptation," NBER Working Papers 4103, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Goldfeld, Stephen M. & Sichel, Daniel E., 1990. "The demand for money," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: B. M. Friedman & F. H. Hahn (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 299-356 Elsevier.
  12. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December.
  13. Akerlof, George A, 1991. "Procrastination and Obedience," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 1-19, May.
  14. Hahn, Frank, 1990. "On Inflation," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(4), pages 15-25, Winter.
  15. Aizenman, Joshua, 1992. "Competitive Externalities and the Optimal Seigniorage," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 24(1), pages 61-71, February.
  16. Michael Bruno, 1989. "Israel's Crisis and Economic Reform: A Historical Perspective," NBER Working Papers 3075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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