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Conflicto distributivo y déficit fiscal algunos juegos inflacionarios

Author

Listed:
  • Heymann, Daniel

    (Oficina de la CEPAL en BUenos Aires)

  • Navajas, Fernando

    (Oficina de la CEPAL en Buenos Aires)

  • Warnes, Ignacio

    (Instituto Torcuato di Tella y CONICET)

Abstract

Introducción. Los casos de inflación elevada y persistente tienen un aspecto pardójico. Por un lado, la inflación tiene claramente consecuencias graves(y percibidas como tales) en el comportamiento económico; por otro lado, el hecho de que ciertos países atraviesen largos periodos de fuerte volatilidad de precios y experimenten dificultades apreciables para alcanzar una estabilización puede sugerir que, en cierto modo, esas economías han "elegido" altas tasas de inflación. Este último enfoque llevaría a suponer que el resultado observado es un "optimo" de algun tipo. De hecho, desde el punto de vista de la política fiscal, es posible especificar modelos(con un esquema general como el que emplean Lucas y Stokey, 1983) en los que la maximización de una función de bienestar implica una tasa no nula de impuesto inflacionario, dados los costos de otros mecanismos de recaudación(véase, por ejemplo, Aizenman, 1985)...

Suggested Citation

  • Heymann, Daniel & Navajas, Fernando & Warnes, Ignacio, 1991. "Conflicto distributivo y déficit fiscal algunos juegos inflacionarios," El Trimestre Económico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, vol. 58(229), pages 101-137, enero-mar.
  • Handle: RePEc:elt:journl:v:58:y:1991:i:229:p:101-137
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    Cited by:

    1. Mondino, Guillermo & Sturzenegger, Federico & Tommasi, Mariano, 1996. "Recurrent High Inflation and Stabilization: A Dynamic Game," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 981-996, November.
    2. Heymann, Daniel & Galiani, Sebastián & Dabús, Carlos & Tohmé, Fernando, 2006. "Two essays on development economics," Estudios y Perspectivas – Oficina de la CEPAL en Buenos Aires 34, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    3. Daniel Arce, 1997. "Fiscal Pacts," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 271-284, July.
    4. Daniel Arce, 1997. "Correlated strategies as Institutions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 271-285, May.

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