Recurrent High Inflation and Stabilization: A Dynamic Game
We analyze the dynamics of inflation that arise from fiscal deficits caused by the noncooperative behavior of interest groups. The "state" variable is the degree of financial adaptation, a proxy for the share of wealth agents hold in alternatives to domestic currency. As financial adaptation becomes widespread, the costs of financing a given budget deficit rise. In this context, there can be fully rational cycles of increasing inflation and financial adaptation, followed by stabilization and remonetization. The model seems applicable to the experi- ence of many Latin American countries
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|Date of creation:||Oct 1995|
|Date of revision:||Nov 1996|
|Publication status:||Published in International Economic Review, November 1996, 37(4): 981-996|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Vito Dumas 284, Victoria, Buenos Aires, B1644BID|
Web page: http://www.udesa.edu.ar
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