Inflation and Social Welfare in a Model With Endogenous Financial Adaptation
This paper develops a model with endogenous financial adaptation. With a representative agent, inflation and welfare increase upon introduction of financial adaptation. Once we allow for agents' heterogeneity, we can show that inflation still increases and that the "poor" are hurt, while the "rich" benefit from the process of financial adaptation. Finally, we consider the optimal level of seigniorage collection. With a representative agent, financial adaptation increases both the optimal level of government spending and the inflation rate. With heterogeneous agents, if the government cares for the low income group, the optimal amount of government spending falls even though the rate of inflation increases. The model accounts for many stylized facts of high inflation economies and explains the incentives behind many policy actions.
|Date of creation:||Jun 1992|
|Date of revision:|
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- Calvo, Guillermo A., 1985. "Currency substitution and the real exchange rate: the utility maximization approach," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 175-188, June.
- repec:fth:harver:1508 is not listed on IDEAS
- Vegh, Carlos A., 1989. "The optimal inflation tax in the presence of currency substitution," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 139-146, July.
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