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Essays on Political Economy of Political Reform

  • Cesar Martinelli

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 625018000000000135.

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Date of creation: 01 Jun 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:625018000000000135
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  1. Ronald Findlay, 1990. "THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY: ITS EXPLANATORY POWER FOR LDCs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 193-221, 07.
  2. Guillermo Mondino & Federico Sturzenegger & Mariano Tommasi, 1992. "Recurrent High Inflation and Stabilization, A Dynamic Game," UCLA Economics Working Papers 678, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Guidotti, Pablo E & Vegh, Carlos A, 1999. "Losing Credibility: The Stabilization Blues," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 23-51, February.
  4. Shang-Jin Wei, 1997. "Gradualism versus Big Bang: Speed and Sustainability of Reforms," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1234-47, November.
  5. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1993. "Bargaining with Private Information," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 45-104, March.
  7. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine.
  8. Jonathan Eaton, 1990. "Sovereign Debt, Reputation, and Credit Terms," NBER Working Papers 3424, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Lal, Deepak, 1987. "The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 1(2), pages 273-99, January.
  10. Diaz-Alejandro, Carlos, 1985. "Good-bye financial repression, hello financial crash," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 1-24.
  11. Michael Mussa, 1982. "Government Policy and the Adjustment Process," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 73-122 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Allan Drazen & Vittorio Grilli, 1990. "The Benefits of Crises for Economic Reforms," NBER Working Papers 3527, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Aghion, P. & Blanchard, O.J., 1993. "On the Speed of Transition in Central Europe," Working papers 93-8, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  14. Douglas W. Diamond, 1998. "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 602, David K. Levine.
  15. Sebastian Edwards, 1992. "Sequencing and Welfare: Labor Markets and Agriculture," NBER Working Papers 4095, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Dornbusch, Rudiger, 1990. "Credibility and Stabilization," CEPR Discussion Papers 454, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December.
  18. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player," Working papers 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  19. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1979. "Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 563-587.
  20. M. Dewatripont & G. Roland, 1992. "Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 703-730.
  21. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  22. Dani Rodrik, 1988. "Promises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform via Signaling," NBER Working Papers 2600, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Guillermo A. Calvo & Jacob A. Frenkel, 1991. "Credit Markets, Credibility, and Economic Transformation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 139-148, Fall.
  24. Robert M. Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  25. van Wijnbergen, S., 1991. "Intertemporal Speculation, Shortages and the Political Economy of Price Reform," Discussion Paper 1991-49, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  26. Sebastian Edwards & Sweder Van Wijnbergen, 1983. "The Welfare Effects of Trade and Capital Market Liberalization: Consequences of Different Sequencing Scenarios," UCLA Economics Working Papers 313, UCLA Department of Economics.
  27. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "A Theory of Exit in Duopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 943-60, July.
  28. Rodrik, Dani, 1993. "The Positive Economics of Policy Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 356-61, May.
  29. Sachs, Jeffrey D, 1992. "The Economic Transformation of Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 5-19.
  30. Dani Rodrik, 1992. "The Limits of Trade Policy Reform in Developing Countries," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 87-105, Winter.
  31. Lazear, Edward P, 1981. "Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(4), pages 606-20, September.
  32. Alesina, A. & Drazen, A., 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," Papers 6-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
  33. Bliss, Christopher & Nalebuff, Barry, 1984. "Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 1-12, November.
  34. Mathias Dewatripont, 1992. "Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/175991, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  35. Dani Rodrik, 1989. "Credibility of Trade Reform — a Policy Maker's Guide," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 1-16, 03.
  36. Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1993. "Industry evolution and transition: the role of information capital," Staff Report 162, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  37. Joel Sobel, 1985. "A Theory of Credibility," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 557-573.
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