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Sequencing of Economic Reforms in the Presence of Political Constraints

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  • C. Martinelli
  • M. Tommasi

Abstract

This paper presents a model portraying a country in a political deadlock about economic reform proposals in which certain measures hurt strongly‐organized interests. We show that when governments are unable to precommit and interest groups have veto power, only far‐reaching reforms (even if quite costly) have hope of success. The model intends to explain why in recent years several Latin American countries have opted for radical reform.

Suggested Citation

  • C. Martinelli & M. Tommasi, 1997. "Sequencing of Economic Reforms in the Presence of Political Constraints," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(2), pages 115-131, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:9:y:1997:i:2:p:115-131
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.92024
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    Cited by:

    1. Douglas Marcouiller, 1995. "Putting in politics: A review of economic models with endogenous determination of policy," Forum for Social Economics, Springer;The Association for Social Economics, vol. 25(1), pages 37-51, September.
    2. Campos, Nauro F. & Horváth, Roman, 2006. "Reform Redux: Measurement, Determinants and Reversals," IZA Discussion Papers 2093, IZA Network @ LISER.
    3. Clemens Buchen, 2023. "Institutional reform paths," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(3), pages 1099-1121, November.
    4. Filippo Belloc & Antonio Nicita, 2011. "Liberalization-Privatization Paths: Policies and Politics," Department of Economics University of Siena 609, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    5. John S. Earle & Scott Gehlbach, 2003. "A Spoonful of Sugar: Privatization and Popular Support for Reform in the Czech Republic," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 1-32, March.
    6. Lora, Eduardo, 1998. "What Makes Reforms Likely? Timing and Sequencing of Structural Reforms in Latin America," Working Papers 244240, Inter-American Development Bank.
    7. Cukierman, Alex & Tommasi, Mariano, 1998. "When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 180-197, March.
    8. Malika AHMED ZAID-CHERTOUK & Philippe BANCE, 2015. "Gouvernances Publiques Et Entreprises Publiques Dans Les Economies De Rente," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 86(4), pages 657-681, December.
    9. Mr. S. Nuri Erbas, 2002. "Primeron Reforms in a Second-Best Ambiguous Environment: A Case for Gradualism," IMF Working Papers 2002/050, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Eduardo Lora & Mauricio Olivera, 2004. "What Makes Reforms Likely: Political Economy Determinants of Reforms in Latin America," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(1), pages 99-135, May.
    11. repec:bla:scandj:v:100:y:1998:i:1:p:367-94 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Jain, Sanjay & Sharun Mukand, 2003. "Public Opinion and the Dynamics of Reform," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 114, Royal Economic Society.
    13. Gerard Rpland, 2001. "The Political Economy of Transition," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 413, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    14. Eduardo Lora, 2000. "¿Que propicia las reformas? La oportunidad y el secuenciamiento de las reformas estructurales en América Latina," Research Department Publications 4218, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    15. Sutter, Daniel, 1999. "Discretionary policy implementation and reform," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 249-262, July.
    16. Alwyn Young, 2000. "The Razor's Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People's Republic of China," NBER Working Papers 7828, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Asturias, Jose & Hur, Sewon & Kehoe, Timothy J. & Ruhl, Kim J., 2016. "The interaction and sequencing of policy reforms," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 45-66.
    18. Micael Castanheira & Gaëtan Nicodème & Paola Profeta, 2012. "On the political economics of tax reforms: survey and empirical assessment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(4), pages 598-624, August.
    19. Hans Pitlik, 2004. "Institutionelle Voraussetzungen marktorientierter Reformen der Wirtschaftspolitik," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 240/2004, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
    20. M. Chatib Basri, 2019. "Comment on “India's Economic Reforms: Achievements and Next Steps”," Asian Economic Policy Review, Japan Center for Economic Research, vol. 14(1), pages 65-66, January.
    21. Castanheira, Micael & Profeta, Paola & Nicodème, Gaëtan, 2011. "On the political economics of tax reforms," CEPR Discussion Papers 8507, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    22. Birdsall, Nancy & de la Torre, Augusto & Caicedo, Felipe Valencia, 2010. "The Washington consensus : assessing a damaged brand," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5316, The World Bank.
    23. Sebastian Edwards & Daniel Lederman, 1998. "The Political Economy of Unilateral Trade Liberalization: The Case of Chile," NBER Working Papers 6510, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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