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Controlled Openness and Foreign Direct Investment

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  • Joshua Aizenman
  • Sang‐Seung Yi

Abstract

The paper investigates why a developing country may adopt a partial reform. A country is considered where the ruling elite (referred to as state capital) prevents the entry of foreign capital, and taxes the private sector before reform. A higher productivity of foreign capital always increases the attractiveness of a partial reform under which state capital can control the inflow of foreign capital, but can reduce the attractiveness of a full reform under which the entry of foreign capital is unregulated. Hence, state capital’s control over foreign capital may be a necessary condition for the reform to take place at all.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua Aizenman & Sang‐Seung Yi, 1998. "Controlled Openness and Foreign Direct Investment," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-10, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:2:y:1998:i:1:p:1-10
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9361.00024
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ramin Dadasov & Philipp Harms & Oliver Lorz, 2013. "Financial integration in autocracies: Greasing the wheel or more to steal?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-22, February.
    2. Klaus Desmet & Felipe Meza & Juan A. Rojas, 2008. "Foreign direct investment and spillovers: gradualism may be better," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 41(3), pages 926-953, August.
    3. Sebastian Claro, 2009. "FDI Liberalization as a Source of Comparative Advantage in China," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 740-753, November.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements

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