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Controlled Openness and Foreign Direct Investment

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  • Joshua Aizenman
  • Sang-Seung Yi

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to offer an explanation of why a developing country may adopt a partial reform under which foreign direct investments are controlled. We consider a country where the ruling elite [referred to as State capital] prevents the entry of Foreign capital and taxes the private sector before reform. The impetus to reform comes from an improved productivity of Foreign capital. The reform diminishes State capital's ability to tax the private sector but allows it to extract payment from Foreign capital for access to its markets. We show that a higher productivity of Foreign capital always increases the attractiveness of a partial reform under which State capital can control the inflow of Foreign capital. In contrast, a higher productivity of Foreign capital can reduce the attractiveness of a full reform under which the entry of Foreign capital is unregulated. Our analysis implies that, under the circumstances where the impetus to reform comes from improvements in Foreign productivity, State capital's exercise of control over Foreign capital's inflow may be a necessary condition for the reform to take place at all. In the absence of such a control, State capital may be reluctant to carry out the efficiency-enhancing reforms."

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua Aizenman & Sang-Seung Yi, 1997. "Controlled Openness and Foreign Direct Investment," NBER Working Papers 6123, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6123
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    Cited by:

    1. Ramin Dadasov & Philipp Harms & Oliver Lorz, 2013. "Financial integration in autocracies: Greasing the wheel or more to steal?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-22, February.
    2. Klaus Desmet & Felipe Meza & Juan A. Rojas, 2008. "Foreign direct investment and spillovers: gradualism may be better," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(3), pages 926-953, August.
    3. Sebastian Claro, 2009. "FDI Liberalization as a Source of Comparative Advantage in China," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(4), pages 740-753, November.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements

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