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Liberalization-privatization paths: policies and politics

Listed author(s):
  • Filippo BELLOC

    ()

  • Antonio NICITA

    ()

We empirically investigate the political determinants of deregulation policies in six network industries of thirty OECD countries, over 1975-2007. Contrary to previous literature, we unbundle privatization and liberalization policies and measure whether their simultaneous determination is affected by government’s ideology. Despite conventional wisdom, we find a systematic political trade-off between privatizations and liberalizations. Right-wing executives tend to privatize more and to liberalize less, relative to left-wing governments. The main lesson we derive is that ideological cleavages affect the composition of deregulation policy. Our results may shed new lights on the political-economic rationale behind deregulation choices.

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File URL: http://wp.demm.unimi.it/files/wp/2011/DEMM-2011_032wp.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 2011-32.

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Date of creation: 30 Nov 2011
Handle: RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2011-32
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