Partisan privatizations: assessing the ideological bias
Previous empirical literature suggests that privatization choices are driven by ideology. However, available measures of this political bias are weakly grounded as they neglect crucial factors affecting privatizations, such as the liberalization levels and the public finance structure. To fill this gap, we perform an econometric analysis explicitly considering such neglected factors. Our findings conclude that privatization choices in OECD network industries are determined by right-wing ideology.
Volume (Year): 19 (2012)
Issue (Month): 10 (July)
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References listed on IDEAS
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