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Leviathan Resists: The Endogenous Relationship Between Privatisation and Firm Performance

Using a unique panel data set of privatised cement firms in Turkey, we test the hypothesis that privatisation and firm performance are determined simultaneously in a political economy context. By focusing on the short- and medium-run joint relationship between privatisation and firm performance, we find that: i) private sector increases the output in the medium-run, but by changing the scale property of production from increasing returns-to-scale to decreasing returnsto- scale, ii) the only factor that increases the labour productivity in the short run is a decrease in labour stock, iii) the negative impact of labour growth on productivity is less severe during the privatised period, and iv) the likelihood of the privatisation of firms decreases if the number of workers employed in firms is high, if they exhibit favourable short-run performance, if the voter preference is less fractionalised and the government representation is weak in the provinces that they are located, and if they are based in socio-economically less developed regions.

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File URL: http://www.deakin.edu.au/buslaw/aef/workingpapers/papers/2005_17.pdf
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Paper provided by Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance in its series Economics Series with number 2005_17.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 17 Oct 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dkn:econwp:eco_2005_17
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Web page: http://www.deakin.edu.au/buslaw/aef/index.php

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  1. Alberto Alesina & Sule Ozler & Nouriel Roubini & Phillip Swagel, 1992. "Political Instability and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 4173, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Clarke, George R. G. & Cull, Robert, 1999. "Why Privatize? The Case of Argentina's Public Provincial Banks," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 865-886, May.
  3. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December.
  4. Heckman, James J, 1978. "Dummy Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous Equation System," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 931-59, July.
  5. Paul Cook & Yuichiro Uchida, 2003. "Privatisation and economic growth in developing countries," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(6), pages 121-154.
  6. Amemiya, Takeshi, 1978. "The Estimation of a Simultaneous Equation Generalized Probit Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(5), pages 1193-1205, September.
  7. Boardman, Anthony E & Vining, Aidan R, 1989. "Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 1-33, April.
  8. Roman Frydman & Cheryl Gray & Marek Hessel & Andrzej Rapaczynski, 1999. "When Does Privatization Work? The Impact Of Private Ownership On Corporate Performance In The Transition Economies," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1153-1191, November.
  9. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-43, December.
  10. Gylfason, Thorvaldur, 1998. "Privatization, Efficiency and Economic Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 1844, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Vining, Aidan R & Boardman, Anthony E, 1992. " Ownership versus Competition: Efficiency in Public Enterprise," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 205-39, March.
  12. John S. Earle & Almos Telegdy, . "Privatization Methods and Productivity Effects in Romanian Industrial Enterprises," Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles jse20024, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
  13. Nandini Gupta, 2005. "Partial Privatization and Firm Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(2), pages 987-1015, 04.
  14. Patrick Plane, 1997. "Privatization and economic growth: an empirical investigation from a sample of developing market economies," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(2), pages 161-178.
  15. Rivers, Douglas & Vuong, Quang H., 1988. "Limited information estimators and exogeneity tests for simultaneous probit models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 347-366, November.
  16. Villalonga, Belen, 2000. "Privatization and efficiency: differentiating ownership effects from political, organizational, and dynamic effects," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 43-74, May.
  17. Shirley, Mary & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "Public versus private ownership : the current state of the debate," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2420, The World Bank.
  18. Sebastian Galiani & Paul Gertler & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2005. "Water for Life: The Impact of the Privatization of Water Services on Child Mortality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(1), pages 83-120, February.
  19. Michael I. Cragg & I. J. Alexander Dyck, 2003. "Privatization and Management Incentives: Evidence from the United Kingdom," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 176-217, April.
  20. J. A. Hausman, 1976. "Specification Tests in Econometrics," Working papers 185, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  21. Clarke, George R G & Cull, Robert, 2002. "Political and Economic Determinants of the Likelihood of Privatizing Argentine Public Banks," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 165-97, April.
  22. Loren Brandt & Hongbin Li & Joanne Roberts, 2005. "Banks and Enterprise Privatization in China," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 524-546, October.
  23. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 1999. "What Drives Deregulation? Economics And Politics Of The Relaxation Of Bank Branching Restrictions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1437-1467, November.
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