When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China
The main result of the paper is that policy reversals are more likely floowing realization of extreme and relatively unlikely values of parameters that map policy choice into outcomes. A corollary to this result is that policy reversals occur infrequently.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Israel TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, THE FOERDER INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, RAMAT AVIV 69 978 TEL AVIV ISRAEL.|
Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/foerder/about
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