Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?
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- Raphaël Soubeyran, 2009. "Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 93-94, pages 301-326.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Anja Prummer, 2016. "Spatial Advertisement in Political Campaigns," Working Papers 805, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
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More about this item
KeywordsCANDIDATE QUALITY; EXTREMISM; PUBLIC GOODS CONSUMPTION;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-05-05 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2008-05-05 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-05-05 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2008-05-05 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2008-05-05 (Positive Political Economics)
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