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Political Cycles: the Opposition Advantage

  • Pascal Gautier

    (GREQAM)

  • Raphael Soubeyran

    (GREQAM)

Registered author(s):

    We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share decreases the longer it stays in power. Parties chances of winning do not converge and, when the median voter is moderate enough, no party can maintain itself in power for ever. Finally, the more parties are specialized and the more public policies have long-term effects, the more political cycles are likely to occur.

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    File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/pe/papers/0510/0510019.pdf
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    Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0510019.

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    Length: 27 pages
    Date of creation: 21 Oct 2005
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0510019
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 27
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org

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    1. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1986. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," NBER Working Papers 1838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, . "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," Working Papers 121, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    3. Stephen Coate & Marco Battaglini, 2005. "Inefficiency in Legislative Policy-Making: A Dynamic Analysis," 2005 Meeting Papers 209, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. Chappell, Henry W, Jr & Keech, William R, 1986. "Party Differences in Macroeconomic Policies and Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 71-74, May.
    5. Prat, A., 1998. "Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters and Multiple Lobbies," Discussion Paper 1998-123, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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    7. Hassler, John & Storesletten, Kjetil & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2007. "Democratic public good provision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 127-151, March.
    8. Enriqueta Aragon├ęs & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2000. "Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate," Economics Working Papers 502, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    9. Enriqueta Aragones, 1994. "Negativity Effect and the Emergence of Ideologies," Discussion Papers 1125, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-41, November.
    11. Alesina, Alberto F & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," CEPR Discussion Papers 269, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March.
    13. Ansolabehere, Stephen & Snyder, James M, Jr, 2000. "Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 327-36, June.
    14. Kramer, Gerald H., 1977. "A dynamical model of political equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 310-334, December.
    15. John E. Roemer, 1995. "Political Cycles," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 1-20, 03.
    16. Marina Azzimonti Renzo, 2004. "On the dynamic inefficiency of governments," 2004 Meeting Papers 228, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    17. Bendor, Jonathan & Mookherjee, Dilip & Ray, Debraj, 2006. "Satisficing and Selection in Electoral Competition," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(2), pages 171-200, March.
    18. Armo Gomes & Philippe Jehiel, 2001. "Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies," Penn CARESS Working Papers 76ff153ae29996d16c454e473, Penn Economics Department.
    19. Sundadam, R.K. & Banks, J., 1991. "Adverse Selection and Moral hazard in a Repeated Elections Models," RCER Working Papers 283, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
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