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A model of partisan central banks and opportunistic political business cycles

  • Sieg, Gernot

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 13 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 503-516

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:13:y:1997:i:3:p:503-516
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  1. Gartner, Manfred, 1994. "Democracy, elections, and macroeconomic policy: Two decades of progress," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 85-109, May.
  2. Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, J├╝rgen & Waller, Christopher, 1993. "Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 752, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. William D. Nordhaus, 1989. "Alternative Approaches to the Political Business Cycle," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 927, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16.
  5. Roubini, Nouriel & Alesina, Alberto, 1992. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies," Scholarly Articles 4553025, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  6. Gartner, Manfred, 1994. "The quest for political cycles in OECD economies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 427-440, October.
  7. Fischer, Stanley, 1977. "Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 191-205, February.
  8. Berger, Helge & Woitek, Ulrich, 1997. "Searching for Political Business Cycles in Germany," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 179-97, April.
  9. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "Reply to Berger and Woitek," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 823-827, December.
  10. Berger, Helge & Woitek, Ulrich, 1997. "How opportunistic are partisan German central bankers: Evidence on the Vaubel hypothesis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 807-821, December.
  11. Kenneth Rogoff, 1987. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Hibbs, Douglas Jr., 1992. "Partisan theory after fifteen years," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 361-373, October.
  13. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
  14. Masciandaro, Donato & Spinelli, Franco, 1994. "Central Banks' Independence: Institutional Determinants, Rankings and Central Bankers' Views," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 41(4), pages 434-43, November.
  15. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
  16. Havrilesky, Thomas & Gildea, John A, 1992. "Reliable and Unreliable Partisan Appointees to the Board of Governors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(4), pages 397-417, June.
  17. Schultz, Kenneth A., 1995. "The Politics of the Political Business Cycle," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(01), pages 79-99, January.
  18. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini, 1992. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 663-688.
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