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Central Banks' Independence: Institutional Determinants, Rankings and Central Bankers' Views

Author

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  • Masciandaro, Donato
  • Spinelli, Franco

Abstract

Over the last few years, it has been shown that the institutional constraints on central banks' behavior matter a lot. This paper supplements the existing literature by supplying a detailed listing and an appropriate grouping of the many constraints that have been considered so far; a ranking of all central banks of OECD countries according to their degrees of independence of governments; and the results of an inquiry into the relevance that central bankers themselves attach to such matters. Copyright 1994 by Scottish Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Masciandaro, Donato & Spinelli, Franco, 1994. "Central Banks' Independence: Institutional Determinants, Rankings and Central Bankers' Views," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 41(4), pages 434-443, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:41:y:1994:i:4:p:434-43
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    Cited by:

    1. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(03), pages 259-289, December.
    2. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2015. "Ups and Downs. Central Bank Independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: Theory, Institutions and Empirics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1503, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    3. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
    4. Vaubel, Roland, 1999. "The Future of the Euro : A Public Choice Perspective," Discussion Papers 570, Institut fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Abteilung fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre.
    5. Eduard Hochreiter & Tadeusz Kowalski, 2000. "Central banks in European emerging market economies in the 1990s," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 53(212), pages 45-70.
    6. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2018. "Beyond the Central Bank Independence Veil: New Evidence," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1871, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    7. repec:zbw:rwidps:0025 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Femke Esch & Eelke Jong, 2013. "Institutionalisation without internalisation. The cultural dimension of French-German conflicts on European Central Bank independence," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 631-648, December.
    9. Göhlmann, Silja & Vaubel, Roland, 2005. "The Educational and Professional Background of Central Bankers and its Effect on Inflation - An Empirical Analysis," RWI Discussion Papers 25, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.
    10. Marc Quintyn, 2009. "Independent agencies: more than a cheap copy of independent central banks?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 267-295, September.
    11. Silja Göhlmann & Roland Vaubel, 2005. "The Educational and Professional Background of Central Bankers and its Effect on Inflation – An Empirical Analysis," RWI Discussion Papers 0025, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.
    12. David Cobham & Stefania Cosci & Fabrizio Mattesini, 2008. "Informal Central Bank Independence: An Analysis For Three European Countries," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(3), pages 251-280, July.
    13. Sieg, Gernot, 1997. "A model of partisan central banks and opportunistic political business cycles," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 503-516, September.
    14. Donato Masciandaro, 1995. "Designing a central bank: Social player, monetary agent, or banking agent?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 399-410, October.

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