The Future of the Euro : A Public Choice Perspective
Public choice analysis can be helpful in predicting the course of European monetary integration and policy. The median (or decisive) voter theorem, the theory of the political business cycle and the economic theory of bureaucracy are all applicable. The purpose of this paper is to explain and predict the behaviour of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Council of Ministers on the basis of the available empirical evidence. Section 2 relies on the median voter theorem to derive predictions for the inflation rate of the euro. It shows that inflation rates have to be explained by the voters' sensitivity to inflation rather than the independence of central bankers and that the French members of the ECB Council hold the median position in terms of past inflation, voters' sensitivity to inflation and predicted or simulated preferred inflation. However, if the historical real exchange rate change is extrapolated and if failure to agree on an Executive Board is considered a possibility, the Belgian member of the ECB Council is the inflation median.
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