Анализ Независимости Центральных Банков Рф, Стран Снг И Восточной Европы
[Analysis of independence of the central banks of the Russian Federation, the CIS and East European countries]
On the basis of an overview of theoretical and empirical studies on central banks’ independence, the paper assesses the independence of the central banks of the former USSR republics including the RF, as well as those of East European countries. An analysis of the potential existence of a relationship between the banks’ independence and some major economic indices, such as inflation, economic activity, and budget deficit, was also performed.
|Date of creation:||May 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:33595. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.