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Central bank independence, inflation and political instability in developing countries

Author

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  • Jakob De Haan
  • Clemens L.J. Siermann

Abstract

We test whether political instability affects central bank independence in developing countries. Both a legal measure and the turnover tate of central bank governors are used as proxies for central bank independence and the frequency of government transfers is used to proxy political instability. Only the number of coups affects the turnover rate of central bank governors. We also find that both the turnover rate of central bank governors and political instability affect the rate of inflation.

Suggested Citation

  • Jakob De Haan & Clemens L.J. Siermann, 1996. "Central bank independence, inflation and political instability in developing countries," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 135-147.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:jpolrf:v:1:y:1996:i:2:p:135-147
    DOI: 10.1080/13841289608523360
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eva Gutierrez, 2003. "Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence; Evidence From Latin America and the Caribbean," IMF Working Papers 03/53, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Eichler, Stefan & Littke, Helge C.N. & Tonzer, Lena, 2017. "Central bank transparency and cross-border banking," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 1-30.
    3. Brumm, Harold J., 2011. "Inflation and central bank independence: Two-way causality?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(3), pages 220-222, June.
    4. Pavel Trunin & Kniazev Dmitriy & Satdarov Alexandr, 2010. "Analysis of independence of the central banks of the Russian Federation, the CIS and East European countries," Research Paper Series, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, issue 133P.
    5. Eva Gutiérrez, 2004. "Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence. Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean," Economía Mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, , vol. 0(2), pages 255-287, July-Dece.
    6. Sven-Olov Daunfeldt & Jörgen Hellström & Mats Landström, 2013. "Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 41(4), pages 427-438, December.
    7. Haan, Jakob de & Kooi, Willem J., 2000. "Does central bank independence really matter?: New evidence for developing countries using a new indicator," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 643-664, April.

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