Inflation and central bank independence: Two-way causality?
It is now generally accepted that there is a negative relationship between inflation and central bank independence (CBI). This study finds that inflation and CBI are endogenously determined, yet the negative correlation between the two remains robust.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jakob De Haan & Clemens L.J. Siermann, 1996. "Central bank independence, inflation and political instability in developing countries," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 135-147.
- Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, 1997. "Central bank independence and inflation targeting: monetary policy paradigms for the next millenium?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Jan, pages 19-36.
- Marta Campillo & Jeffrey A. Miron, 1996.
"Why Does Inflation Differ Across Countries?,"
NBER Working Papers
5540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B, 1995.
"Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence,"
World Bank Economic Review,
World Bank Group, vol. 9(3), pages 397-423, September.
- Alex Cukierman & Steven Webb, 1995. "Political Influence on the Central Bank- International Evidence," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 114, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Cukierman, A. & Webb, S., 1994. "Political Influence on the Central Bank : International Evidence," Discussion Paper 1994-100, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Axel Dreher & Jakob de Haan & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2007.
"Does High Inflation Cause Central Bankers to Lose their Job? Evidence Based on a New Data Set,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
2045, CESifo Group Munich.
- Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & de Haan, Jakob, 2008. "Does high inflation cause central bankers to lose their job? Evidence based on a new data set," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 778-787, December.
- Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & Jakob de Haan, 2007. "Does High Inflation Cause Central Bankers to Lose Their Job? Evidence Based on a New Data Set," KOF Working papers 07-167, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
- Farvaque, Etienne, 2002. "Political determinants of central bank independence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 131-135, September.
- Brumm, Harold J., 2006. "The effect of central bank independence on inflation in developing countries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 189-193, February.
- Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
- Satorra, Albert & Bentler, Peter M., 1990. "Model conditions for asymptotic robustness in the analysis of linear relations," Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 235-249, December.
- Alex Cukierman, 1992.
"Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981.
- Cukierman Alex, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, And Independance: Theory And Evidence," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 1-10, December.
- Brumm, Harold J, 2000. "Inflation and Central Bank Independence: Conventional Wisdom Redux," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(4), pages 807-819, November.
- Aigner, Dennis J. & Hsiao, Cheng & Kapteyn, Arie & Wansbeek, Tom, 1984. "Latent variable models in econometrics," Handbook of Econometrics, in: Z. Griliches† & M. D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 23, pages 1321-1393 Elsevier.
- Bagheri, Fatholla M & Habibi, Nader, 1998. "Political Institutions and Central Bank Independence: A Cross-Country Analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 187-204, July.
- Moser, Peter, 1999. "Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(8), pages 1569-1593, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:3:p:220-222. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.