Political Institutions and Central Bank Independence: A Cross-Country Analysis
Using three quantitative measures of Central Bank independence, the authors apply OLS and TSLS regression methods to investigate the possible correlation between political liberty, political instability and central bank independence. For a sample of Western democracies and highly democratic developing countries they show that Cukierman's legal independence index is positively correlated with political freedom and regime political stability. It is negatively correlated with party political stability. For a sample of developing countries that excludes dictatorships the authors show that a special index of legal central bank autonomy is positively associated with political freedom and political stability. Finally, they observe that, for the same sample of nations, the turnover index of central bank independence is not sensitive to the authors' political variables. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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