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Reconsidering central bank independence

  • Hayo, Bernd
  • Hefeker, Carsten

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 18 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 653-674

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:18:y:2002:i:4:p:653-674
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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