Can reputation resolve the monetary policy credibility problem?
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- Li, Jingyuan & Liu, Yongming & Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "A reputation strategic model of monetary policy in continuous-time," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 523-533, December.
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- Guzzo, Vincenzo & Velasco, Andres, 1999. "The case for a populist Central Banker," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1317-1344, June.
- Evans, Joanne & Levine, Paul & Trillas, Francesc, 2008. "Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-40, January.
- Joanne Evans & Paul Levine & Fransesc Trillas, 2006. "Lobbies, Delegation and the Under-investment Problem in Regulation," School of Economics Discussion Papers 2006, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
- Levine, Paul & McAdam, Peter & Pearlman, Joseph, 2008. "Quantifying and sustaining welfare gains from monetary commitment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(7), pages 1253-1276, October.
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- repec:kap:empiri:v:44:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10663-016-9316-8 is not listed on IDEAS
- SCHELLEKENS, Philip, 1999. "Optimal monetary policy delegation to conservative central banks," Working Papers 1999009, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- Jensen, Christian, 2016. "Discretion Rather than Rules? Binding Commitments versus Discretionary Policymaking," MPRA Paper 76838, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Wren-Lewis, Liam, 2013. "Commitment in utility regulation: A model of reputation and policy applications," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 210-231.
- Liam Wren-Lewis, 2013. "Commitment in utility regulation: A model of reputation and policy applications," Post-Print halshs-01516947, HAL.
- Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.
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