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The credibility of policy announcements: Greek evidence

Author

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  • Nikos Apergis
  • John Papanastasiou
  • Kostas Velentzas

Abstract

This paper by using error correction (EC) methodology, along with Chow stability tests, examines whether three cases of policy announcements in Greece, over the 1975-1995 period, have been considered credible or not by the public. Focusing on the Phillips curve trade-off, the empirical findings reveal that two out of three policy announcements are characterized as credible by private agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Nikos Apergis & John Papanastasiou & Kostas Velentzas, 1997. "The credibility of policy announcements: Greek evidence," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(6), pages 699-705.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:29:y:1997:i:6:p:699-705
    DOI: 10.1080/000368497326633
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Laopodis, Nikiforos T., 2004. "Financial market liberalization and stock market efficiency: Evidence from the Athens Stock Exchange," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 103-123, August.
    3. Nicholas Apergis, 1998. "Inflation and Uncertainty: Does the EMS Participation Play Any Role?," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 13, pages 586-605.

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