IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Domestic pressures and the exchange rate regime: why economically bad decisions are politically popular?

  • H.P. GRÃœNER

    (University of Konstanz)

  • C. HEFEKER

    (University of Konstanz)

Every currency crisis brings with it a discussion on the optimal choice of the exchange rate regime. This literature is characterised by an exclusive focus on this single policy issue whilst taking other institutional choices as given. The authors attempt to develop an approach which incorporates a simultaneous choice of three major institutional elements that are germane to this issue and which affect social welfare.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/10496/10383
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by Banca Nazionale del Lavoro in its journal BNL Quarterly Review.

Volume (Year): 48 (1995)
Issue (Month): 194 ()
Pages: 331-350

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:psl:bnlaqr:1995:34
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.economiacivile.it

Order Information: Web: http://www.economiacivile.it

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Olivier J. Blanchard & Lawrence H. Summers, 1986. "Hysteresis and the European Unemployment Problem," Working papers 427, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  2. Peree, Eric & Steinherr, Alfred, 1989. "Exchange rate uncertainty and foreign trade," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1241-1264, July.
  3. Gottfries, Nils & Horn, Henrik, 1987. "Wage Formation and the Persistence of Unemployment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(388), pages 877-84, December.
  4. Barry Eichengreen & Jeffry Frieden, 1993. "The Political Economy Of European Monetary Unification: An Analytical Introduction," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(2), pages 85-104, 07.
  5. George Tavlas, 1994. "The theory of monetary integration," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 211-230, March.
  6. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March.
  7. Vickers, John, 1986. "Signalling in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 443-55, November.
  8. Hefeker, Carsten, 1995. "The political choice and collapse of fixed exchange rates," Discussion Papers, Series II 277, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
  9. Casella, Alessandra, 1992. "On Markets and Clubs: Economic and Political Integration of Regions with Unequal Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 115-21, May.
  10. Richard Baldwin & Paul Krugman, 1989. "Persistent Trade Effects of Large Exchange Rate Shocks," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(4), pages 635-654.
  11. Avinash Dixit, 1989. "Hysteresis, Import Penetration, and Exchange Rate Pass-Through," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(2), pages 205-228.
  12. Gilles Saint-Paul, 1994. "Do Labor Market Rigidities Fulfill Distributive Objectives?: Searching for the Virtues of the European Model," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 41(4), pages 624-642, December.
  13. Vaubel, Roland, 1990. "Currency Competition and European Monetary Integration," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(402), pages 936-46, September.
  14. Alberto Giovannini, 1993. "Bretton Woods and Its Precursors: Rules versus Discretion in the History of International Monetary Regimes," NBER Chapters, in: A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform, pages 109-154 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. David Backus & John Driffill, 1984. "Inflation and Reputation," Working Papers 560, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  16. de Kock, Gabriel & Grilli, Vittorio, 1993. "Fiscal Policies and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(417), pages 347-58, March.
  17. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1995. "Some political aspects of unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 575-582, April.
  18. Wyplosz, Charles, 1989. "Asymmetry in the EMS: Intentional or systemic?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(2-3), pages 310-320, March.
  19. Francesco Giavazzi & Marco Pagano, 1991. "The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility," NBER Chapters, in: International Volatility and Economic Growth: The First Ten Years of The International Seminar on Macroeconomics, pages 303-330 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Grilli, Vittorio, 1989. "Exchange rates and seigniorage," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(2-3), pages 580-587, March.
  21. Eichengreen, B., 1992. "Should the Maastricht Treaty be Saved?," Princeton Studies in International Economics 74, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
  22. Robert Flood & Michael Mussa, 1994. "Issues Concerning Nominal Anchors for Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 4850, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
  24. Bofinger, Peter, 1994. "Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?," CEPR Discussion Papers 915, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  26. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
  27. Grüner, Hans Peter & Hefeker, Carsten, 1994. "Bank cooperation and banking policy in a monetary union: A political-economy perspective on EMU," Discussion Papers, Series II 238, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
  28. Cohen, Daniel & Wyplosz, Charles, 1989. "The European Monetary Union: An Agnostic Evaluation," CEPR Discussion Papers 306, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  29. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
  30. De Grauwe, Paul, 1993. "The Political Economy of Monetary Union in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 842, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  31. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:psl:bnlaqr:1995:34. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Carlo D'Ippoliti)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.