Central bank independence in another eleven countries
The rationale for the independence of central banks is the so-called 'Rules versus Discretion' debate, which is described in this article. Central bank independence is considered an effective measure against governments from manipulating policy instruments to spur short-term economic growth and employment. Several, recent indices that purport to measure central bank independence are amalgamated and applied to ten European countries, plus New Zealand. Appendices are included on the central bank laws in the eleven countries.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Macroeconomics and Politics," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
- Jakob De Haan & Jan Egbert Sturm, 1992.
"The Case for Central Bank Independence,"
BNL Quarterly Review,
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 45(182), pages 305-327.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1992. "Central bank independence : Criteria and indices," Research Memorandum FEW 548, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- repec:dgr:kubrem:1992548 is not listed on IDEAS
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:psl:bnlaqr:1995:13. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Carlo D'Ippoliti)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.