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The Case for Central Bank Independence

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Listed author(s):
  • Jakob De Haan
  • Jan Egbert Sturm

Abstract

This paper reviews arguments for central bank independence and presents new evidence on the impact of central bank (in)dependence on the level and variability of inflation, money growth, the level and financing of government budget deficits and economic growth, using three different measures of central bank independence. There are indications that countries with an independent central bank experience a lower and more stable inflation rate than countries with a central bank which comes under direct political control. Moreover, central bank credit to government and government budget deficits are lower, while economic growth is not directly affected by central bank independence.

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File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/10634/10518
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Article provided by Banca Nazionale del Lavoro in its journal Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review.

Volume (Year): 45 (1992)
Issue (Month): 182 ()
Pages: 305-327

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Handle: RePEc:psl:bnlqrr:1992:33
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Keywords: Money; central bank independence;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
  • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
  • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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  1. Alesina, Alberto & Sachs, Jeffrey, 1988. "Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(1), pages 63-82, February.
  2. Fischer, Stanley, 1981. "Towards an understanding of the costs of inflation: II," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 5-41, January.
  3. Sachs, Jeffrey & Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984," Scholarly Articles 4553026, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  4. Allen, Stuart D, 1986. "The Federal Reserve and the Electoral Cycle: A Note," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 18(1), pages 88-94, February.
  5. Manfred Neumann, 1991. "Precommitment by central bank independence," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 95-112, June.
  6. Cukierman, Alex & Wachtel, Paul, 1979. "Differential Inflationary Expectations and the Variability of the Rate of Inflation: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 595-609, September.
  7. Engle, Robert F, 1983. "Estimates of the Variance of U.S. Inflation Based upon the ARCH Model," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 15(3), pages 286-301, August.
  8. Burdekin, Richard C. K. & Wohar, Mark E., 1990. "Monetary institutions, budget deficits and inflation : Empirical results for eight countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 531-551.
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  12. Giannaros, Demetrios S. & Kolluri, Bharat R., 1985. "Deficit spending, money, and inflation: Some international empirical evidence," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 401-417.
  13. Fischer, S., 1991. "Growth, Macroeconomics, and Development," Working papers 580, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  14. Friedman, Milton, 1971. "Government Revenue from Inflation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(4), pages 846-856, July-Aug..
  15. Stanley Fischer, 1991. "Growth, Macroeconomics, and Development," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1991, Volume 6, pages 329-379 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Barnhart, Scott W. & Darrat, Ali F., 1988. "Budget deficits, money growth and causality: Further OECD evidence," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 231-242, June.
  17. Havrilesky, Thomas, 1988. "Monetary Policy Signaling from the Administration to the Federal Reserve," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(1), pages 83-101, February.
  18. M.A. Akhtar & Howard Howe, 1991. "The political and institutional independence of U.S. monetary policy," Research Paper 9110, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  19. Donato Masciandaro & Guido Tabellini, 1987. "Monetary regimes and fiscal deficits: a comparative analysis," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, pages 125-152.
  20. Mankiw, N. Gregory, 1987. "The optimal collection of seigniorage : Theory and evidence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 327-341, September.
  21. Stanley Fischer, 1991. "Growth, Macroeconomics, and Development," NBER Working Papers 3702, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Tabellini, Guido, 1986. "Money, debt and deficits in a dynamic game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 427-442, December.
  23. De Haan, Jakob & Zelhorst, Dick, 1990. "The impact of government deficits on money growth in developing countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 455-469, December.
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Cited by:

  1. Adolfo Meisel & Juan D. Barón, 2010. "Un análisis histórico de la independencia de la banca central en América Latina: la experiencia colombiana, 1923-2008," CUADERNOS DE HISTORIA ECONÓMICA Y EMPRESARIAL 006406, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA - ECONOMÍA REGIONAL.
  2. S. Eijffinger & M. Van Keulen, 1995. "Central bank independence in another eleven countries," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 48(192), pages 39-81.
  3. Lucotte, Yannick, 2012. "Adoption of inflation targeting and tax revenue performance in emerging market economies: An empirical investigation," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 609-628.
  4. Nicola Acocella, "undated". "Teoria e pratica della politica economica: l’eredità del recente passato," Working Papers 104/13, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e modelli per l'economia, il territorio e la finanza MEMOTEF.
  5. Loungani, Prakash & Sheets, Nathan, 1997. "Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 381-399, August.
  6. Solveen, Ralph, 1996. "Geldpolitik und Staatsverschuldung - welche Rolle spielt die Unabhängigkeit der Notenbank?," Kiel Working Papers 750, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  7. F. Passacantando, 1996. "Building an institutional framework for monetary stability: the case of Italy (1979-1994)," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 49(196), pages 83-132.
  8. J. De Haan & W. Kooi, 1997. "What really matters: conservativeness or independence?," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 50(200), pages 23-38.
  9. Gürbüz Beşek, Yeşim, 2011. "Crédibilité en matière de ciblage d'inflation," GIAM Working Papers 11-1, Galatasaray University Economic Research Center, revised 08 Feb 2011.
  10. Axel Dreher & Katharina Michaelowa, 2008. "The political economy of international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 331-334, December.
  11. F. Passacantando, 1996. "Building an institutional framework for monetary stability: the case of Italy (1979-1994)," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 49(196), pages 83-132.
  12. Nicola Acocella, "undated". "The theoretical roots of EMU institutions and policies during the crisis," Working Papers 126/14, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e modelli per l'economia, il territorio e la finanza MEMOTEF.
  13. Nicola Acocella, "undated". "A tale of two cities: exit policies in Washington and Frankfurt," Working Papers 117/13, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e modelli per l'economia, il territorio e la finanza MEMOTEF.

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