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The Case for Central Bank Independence

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  • Jakob De Haan
  • Jan Egbert Sturm

Abstract

This paper reviews arguments for central bank independence and presents new evidence on the impact of central bank (in)dependence on the level and variability of inflation, money growth, the level and financing of government budget deficits and economic growth, using three different measures of central bank independence. There are indications that countries with an independent central bank experience a lower and more stable inflation rate than countries with a central bank which comes under direct political control. Moreover, central bank credit to government and government budget deficits are lower, while economic growth is not directly affected by central bank independence.

Suggested Citation

  • Jakob De Haan & Jan Egbert Sturm, 1992. "The Case for Central Bank Independence," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 45(182), pages 305-327.
  • Handle: RePEc:psl:bnlqrr:1992:33
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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/10634/10518
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    Cited by:

    1. Adolfo Meisel & Juan D. Barón, 2010. "Un análisis histórico de la independencia de la banca central en América Latina: la experiencia colombiana, 1923-2008," Cuadernos de historia económica 006406, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA - ECONOMÍA REGIONAL.
    2. S. Eijffinger & M. Van Keulen, 1995. "Central bank independence in another eleven countries," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 48(192), pages 39-81.
    3. Lucotte, Yannick, 2012. "Adoption of inflation targeting and tax revenue performance in emerging market economies: An empirical investigation," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 609-628.
    4. Nicola Acocella, "undated". "Teoria e pratica della politica economica: l’eredità del recente passato," Working Papers 104/13, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e modelli per l'economia, il territorio e la finanza MEMOTEF.
    5. Loungani, Prakash & Sheets, Nathan, 1997. "Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 381-399, August.
    6. Solveen, Ralph, 1996. "Geldpolitik und Staatsverschuldung - welche Rolle spielt die Unabhängigkeit der Notenbank?," Kiel Working Papers 750, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    7. F. Passacantando, 1996. "Building an institutional framework for monetary stability: the case of Italy (1979-1994)," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 49(196), pages 83-132.
    8. J. De Haan & W. Kooi, 1997. "What really matters: conservativeness or independence?," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 50(200), pages 23-38.
    9. Gürbüz Beşek, Yeşim, 2011. "Crédibilité en matière de ciblage d'inflation," GIAM Working Papers 11-1, Galatasaray University Economic Research Center, revised 08 Feb 2011.
    10. Axel Dreher & Katharina Michaelowa, 2008. "The political economy of international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 331-334, December.
    11. F. Passacantando, 1996. "Building an institutional framework for monetary stability: the case of Italy (1979-1994)," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 49(196), pages 83-132.
    12. Nicola Acocella, "undated". "The theoretical roots of EMU institutions and policies during the crisis," Working Papers 126/14, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e modelli per l'economia, il territorio e la finanza MEMOTEF.
    13. Nicola Acocella, "undated". "A tale of two cities: exit policies in Washington and Frankfurt," Working Papers 117/13, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e modelli per l'economia, il territorio e la finanza MEMOTEF.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Money; central bank independence;

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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