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Politics and Fed policymaking : The more things change the more they remain the same

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  • Kane, Edward J.

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  • Kane, Edward J., 1980. "Politics and Fed policymaking : The more things change the more they remain the same," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 199-211, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:6:y:1980:i:2:p:199-211
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    Cited by:

    1. Jakob De Haan & Jan Egbert Sturm, 1992. "The Case for Central Bank Independence," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 45(182), pages 305-327.
    2. Edward J. Kane, 1988. "The Impact Of A New Federal Reserve Chairman," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 6(1), pages 89-97, January.
    3. Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1126-1139.
    4. Daniel J. Richards, 1993. "What inflation policy do American voters want, and do they get it?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 33-44.
    5. Richard Herring, 2010. "How Financial Oversight Failed & What it May Portend for the Future of Regulation," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 38(3), pages 265-282, September.
    6. Joseph G. Haubrich, 1995. "Vagueness, credibility, and government policy," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q I, pages 13-19.
    7. repec:zbw:rwirep:0094 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Larry Wall & Robert Eisenbeis, 1999. "Financial Regulatory Structure and the Resolution of Conflicting Goals," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 16(2), pages 223-245, December.
    9. Havrilesky, Thomas, 1995. "Restructuring the Fed," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 95-111, May.
    10. Leroy Laney & Thomas Willett, 1983. "Presidential politics, budget deficits, and monetary policy in the United States; 1960–1976," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 53-69, January.
    11. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
    12. Jim Granato & William West, 1994. "Words And Deeds: Symbolic Politics And Decision Making At The Federal Reserve," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 233-255, November.
    13. Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan, 1997. "A State within the State? An Event Study on the Bundesbank," CESifo Working Paper Series 131, CESifo Group Munich.
    14. repec:jpe:journl:1461 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0094, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    16. Boettke, Peter & Smith, Daniel, 2011. "Robust political economy and the Federal Reserve," MPRA Paper 32092, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Kane, Edward J., 2011. "Unmet Duties in Managing Financial Safety Nets," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(01), pages 1-22, January.
    18. James Forder, 2005. "The limits of `independence' and the policy of the ECB^," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 431-444, December.

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