IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/r/eee/moneco/v6y1980i2p199-211.html
   My bibliography  Save this item

Politics and Fed policymaking : The more things change the more they remain the same

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as


Cited by:

  1. Francesco Salsano, 2022. "Monetary policy when the objectives of central bankers are imperfectly observable," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 69(4), pages 396-415, September.
  2. Daniel J. Richards, 1993. "What inflation policy do American voters want, and do they get it?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 33-44.
  3. Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1126-1139.
  4. Joseph G. Haubrich, 1995. "Vagueness, credibility, and government policy," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q I, pages 13-19.
  5. repec:zbw:rwirep:0094 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Lei Chen & Hui Li & Frank Hong Liu & Yue Zhou, 2021. "Bank regulation and systemic risk: cross country evidence," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 353-387, July.
  7. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2011. "Politics and Monetary Policy," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 93(3), pages 941-960, August.
  8. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
  9. Jim Granato & William West, 1994. "Words And Deeds: Symbolic Politics And Decision Making At The Federal Reserve," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 233-255, November.
  10. Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan & Jakob de Haan, 1997. "A State within the State? An Event Study on the Bundesbank," CESifo Working Paper Series 131, CESifo.
  11. repec:jpe:journl:1461 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. James Forder, 2005. "The limits of `independence' and the policy of the ECB^," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 431-444, December.
  13. Gregory D. Hess & Cameron A. Shelton, 2016. "Congress and the Federal Reserve," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(4), pages 603-633, June.
  14. Larry Wall & Robert Eisenbeis, 1999. "Financial Regulatory Structure and the Resolution of Conflicting Goals," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 16(2), pages 223-245, December.
  15. Jakob De Haan & Jan Egbert Sturm, 1992. "The Case for Central Bank Independence," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 45(182), pages 305-327.
  16. Edward J. Kane, 1988. "The Impact Of A New Federal Reserve Chairman," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 6(1), pages 89-97, January.
  17. Richard Herring, 2010. "How Financial Oversight Failed & What it May Portend for the Future of Regulation," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 38(3), pages 265-282, September.
  18. Down Ian, 2009. "Central Bank Independence, Disinflations and Monetary Policy," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(3), pages 1-22, January.
  19. Havrilesky, Thomas, 1995. "Restructuring the Fed," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 95-111, May.
  20. Leroy Laney & Thomas Willett, 1983. "Presidential politics, budget deficits, and monetary policy in the United States; 1960–1976," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 53-69, January.
  21. Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0094, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  22. Alexander W. Salter & William J. Luther, 2019. "Adaptation and central banking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 243-256, September.
  23. Caitlin Ainsley, 2022. "Federal reserve appointments and the politics of senate confirmation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 93-110, January.
  24. Boettke, Peter & Smith, Daniel, 2011. "Robust political economy and the Federal Reserve," MPRA Paper 32092, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  25. Hyunwoo Kim, 2023. "Monetary technocracy and democratic accountability: how central bank independence conditions economic voting," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(3), pages 939-964, May.
  26. Kane, Edward J., 2011. "Unmet Duties in Managing Financial Safety Nets," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 1-22, January.
IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.