Politics and Fed policymaking : The more things change the more they remain the same

Citations

Cited by:

1. Daniel J. Richards, 1993. "What inflation policy do American voters want, and do they get it?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 33-44.
2. Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1126-1139.
   • Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2009. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 94, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
   • Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2011. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy?: A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1180, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
   • Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries," Munich Reprints in Economics 20245, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
   • Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2011. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2011-48, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
3. repec:jpe:journl:1461 is not listed on IDEAS
4. James Forder, 2005. "The limits of `independence' and the policy of the ECB^," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 431-444, December.
5. Gregory D. Hess & Cameron A. Shelton, 2016. "Congress and the Federal Reserve," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(4), pages 603-633, June.
6. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2011. "Politics and Monetary Policy," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 93(3), pages 941-960, August.
   • Ehrmann, Michael & Fratzscher, Marcel, 2010. "Politics and Monetary Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 8143, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
7. Larry Wall & Robert Eisenbeis, 1999. "Financial Regulatory Structure and the Resolution of Conflicting Goals," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 16(2), pages 223-245, December.
   • Robert A. Eisenbeis & Larry D. Wall, 1998. "Financial regulatory structure and the resolution of conflicting goals," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Sep.
   • Robert A. Eisenbeis & Larry D. Wall, 1999. "Financial regulatory structure and the resolution of conflicting goals," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 99-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
8. Jakob De Haan & Jan Egbert Sturm, 1992. "The Case for Central Bank Independence," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 45(182), pages 305-327.
   • Jakob De Haan & Jan Egbert Sturm, 1992. "The Case for Central Bank Independence," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 45(182), pages 305-327.
9. Edward J. Kane, 1988. "The Impact Of A New Federal Reserve Chairman," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 6(1), pages 89-97, January.
10. Richard Herring, 2010. "How Financial Oversight Failed & What it May Portend for the Future of Regulation," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 38(3), pages 265-282, September.
11. Louis Rouanet & Alexander William Salter, 2025. "Mission creep at the Federal Reserve," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 91(4), pages 1323-1346, April.
12. Leroy Laney & Thomas Willett, 1983. "Presidential politics, budget deficits, and monetary policy in the United States; 1960–1976," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 53-69, January.
13. Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0094, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
14. Alexander W. Salter & William J. Luther, 2019. "Adaptation and central banking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 243-256, September.
15. Caitlin Ainsley, 2022. "Federal reserve appointments and the politics of senate confirmation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 93-110, January.
16. Kane, Edward J., 2011. "Unmet Duties in Managing Financial Safety Nets," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 1-22, January.
    • Edward J. Kane, 2009. "Unmet Duties in Managing Financial Safety Nets," NFI Policy Briefs 2009-PB-06a, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute, revised Apr 2010.
17. Francesco Salsano, 2022. "Monetary policy when the objectives of central bankers are imperfectly observable," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 69(4), pages 396-415, September.
18. Joseph G. Haubrich, 1995. "Vagueness, credibility, and government policy," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q I, pages 13-19.
19. repec:zbw:rwirep:0094 is not listed on IDEAS
20. Lei Chen & Hui Li & Frank Hong Liu & Yue Zhou, 2021. "Bank regulation and systemic risk: cross country evidence," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 353-387, July.
21. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
22. Jim Granato & William West, 1994. "Words And Deeds: Symbolic Politics And Decision Making At The Federal Reserve," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 233-255, November.
23. Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan & Jakob de Haan, 1997. "A State within the State? An Event Study on the Bundesbank," CESifo Working Paper Series 131, CESifo.
24. Down Ian, 2009. "Central Bank Independence, Disinflations and Monetary Policy," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(3), pages 1-22, January.
25. Havrilesky, Thomas, 1995. "Restructuring the Fed," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 95-111, May.
26. Boettke, Peter & Smith, Daniel, 2011. "Robust political economy and the Federal Reserve," MPRA Paper 32092, University Library of Munich, Germany.
27. Hyunwoo Kim, 2023. "Monetary technocracy and democratic accountability: how central bank independence conditions economic voting," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(3), pages 939-964, May.