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Adaptation and central banking

Author

Listed:
  • Alexander W. Salter

    (Texas Tech University)

  • William J. Luther

    (Florida Atlantic University)

Abstract

What or who governs central bank decisions? Most considerations focus on motivations. Instead, we consider the extent to which specific behaviors have adaptive value in the context of central banking. From that perspective, poor decisions are not the product of poor motivations. They are, instead, a product of the poor institutions within which central bank decision makers operate.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander W. Salter & William J. Luther, 2019. "Adaptation and central banking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 243-256, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:180:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-018-00633-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-00633-9
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    Cited by:

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    2. Thomas L. Hogan, Daniel J. Smith, Robin Aguiar-Hicks, 2018. "Central Banking without Romance," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 15(2), pages 293-314, December.
    3. Jac C. Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson, 2021. "Targeting inflation targeting: the influence of interest groups," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 533-554, December.
    4. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Nicolás Cachanosky, 2021. "Microfoundations and macroeconomics: 20 years," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 34(2), pages 279-288, June.
    6. Nicolás Cachanosky, 0. "Microfoundations and macroeconomics: 20 years," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 0, pages 1-10.
    7. Peter J. Boettke & Alexander W. Salter & Daniel J. Smith, 2018. "Money as meta-rule: Buchanan’s constitutional economics as a foundation for monetary stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 529-555, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Adaptation; Bailout; Central bank; Motivation; Seigniorage; Selection; Research;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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